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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CONTRACTS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT CONTRACTS
DESIGNED TO LIMIT VENUE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE FEDERAL EM-
PLOYEES' ACT ARE VALID--The appeal taken in the recent case of Akerly
v. New York Central Railroad Company' required the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to pass upon the validity of
an agreement designed to limit venue in proceedings arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Plaintiff therein, a resident of Penn-
1 168 F. (2d) 812 (1948), reversing 73 F. Supp. 903 (1947). M iller, C. J., wrote
a dissenting opinion.
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sylvania, was injured in that state while working on a locomotive owned
by his employer, a New York railroad corporation. Subsequent to the
injury, the railroad company made an advancement of a sum of money
to plaintiff for living expenses, in consideration of which the plaintiff
agreed in writing not to sue the railroad in any court outside the state
where the injuries were sustained or outside the state where he resided
at the time of the accident. Plaintiff did sue the railroad to recover
damages for his injuries but brought the action in a federal district court
located in Ohio, contrary to the terms of his contract. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, supporting its mo-
tion by the agreement aforesaid, which motion was granted. On appeal
by plaintiff, predicated on the argument that the agreement was void
as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act2 and
was also lacking in consideration, the majority of the higher court re-
versed the decision of the trial court and remanded the cause for further
proceedings.3 It found the agreement to be void on three grounds, to-
wit: (1) that as the venue provision of the statute forms an inherent
part of the employer's liability,4 any attempt to limit venue by contract
amounted to an attempt to exempt the railroad from liability; (2) that
public policy prohibits the enforcement of contracts which purport to
limit access to the courts; and (3) that there was no consideration for
the contract since the amount advanced was to be deducted from the
amount of any final settlement.5
It would appear that this is the first time that a federal court of
the rank indicated has had occasion to pass on the validity of agreements
of this character, although the issue has been raised heretofore and has
been decided both ways, principally because of a difference of opinion as
to the purpose intended by Congress when passing the statute in ques-
tion. The problem arises over the meaning of the word "liability" as
found in Section 5 of the statute. Was it designed to bear its usual
2 45 U. S. C. A. § 55 provides: "Any contract, rule, regulation or device what-
soever. the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to
exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be
void .... ." Italics added.
3 The dissent by Miller, C. J., was based on the idea that the consideration was
sufficient and the contract was not illegal as it did not affect the liability of the
defendant nor tend to exempt it from paying damages.
4 45 U. S. C. A. § 56, fixing venue, declares in part that "an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of
the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action."
5 It is recognized that a contract lacking in consideration is unenforcible. For
the purpose of this discussion, however, it is assumed that the contract in question
was adequately supported by consideration. As to whether payment of a sum of
money to be credited on an eventual recovery is sufficient consideration, see 13
C. J. S., Contracts, § 154, and cases there cited.
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connotation of responsibility to respond in damages or to possess some
esoteric meaning? On the surface, at least, there would appear to be
no reason for going behind the language of the act, nor is there any
glossary provided with the statute fixing a special definition, so unless
considerable judicial legislation is indulged in only contracts granting
exemption from liability would appear to be banned. The contract in the
instant case granted no such absolute exemption, hence did not fall clearly
within the statutory prohibition.
It has been decided that the prohibition against contracts designed
to exempt from liability does not apply to releases,6 but it is possible
that Congress may have intended that Section 5 should apply to both
contracts made before liability has accrued, that is to those designed to
prevent it from ever arising,7 and to those made after the occurrence of
injury but not made to operate as releases.8 The statute does not fix the
time of making of the contract as the basis for testing validity, hence
the prohibition should not be limited solely to invalidate contracts made
before injury. But does it prohibit anything more than contracts designed-
to "exempt" from liability? Wherever there is liability the employer can-
not escape by any contract short of a release, but is there warrant for
giving strange meanings to the word "liability" so as to strike down
agreements, whenever made, which leave liability to be determined?
A federal district court sitting in Illinois, in the case of Sherman
v. Pere Marquette Railway Company,9 by taking parts of Sections 5
and 6 of the statute in question and adding them together, came up with
the idea that an agreement of the type in question was invalid on the
theory that the comprehensive phraseology of Section 5 included contracts
the purpose or intent of which was to enable the common carrier to exempt
itself from liability to suit if not entirely then at least in the district in
which the defendant was doing business at the time of commencing the
action.' 0
Much the same idea was adopted by a majority of the judges of the
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Petersen v. Ogden Union Railway
6Callen v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed. 235
(1947). The court indicated that a release is not a device "to exempt from lia-
bility but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent
recognizing its possibility."
7 See, for example, Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Wagner, 239 U. S. 452, 36 S. Ct.
135, 60 L. Ed. 379 (1915).
8 Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U. S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422, 86 L. Ed. 575 (1941). See
also annotation in 166 A. L. R. 648.
9 62 F. Supp. 590 (1945).
10 This concoction seems to have appealed to the majority of the court deciding
the instant case, for it followed much the same recipe.
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& Depot Company,11 only there the agreement was one not to sue in any
court except the "District Court of the United States, Northern Division."
That case presented a situation somewhat different from the one posed
in the instant problem and also from that involved in the Pere Marquette
case, in that the claimant was limited to suit in one federal court whereas
the instant agreement allowed the claimant to sue in either a state or
federal court anywhere in the state while the earlier federal case dealt
with an agreement which named one state and one federal forum. Courts
achieving the same result as that attained in the instant case, however,
do not appear to have given much regard to such distinctions, being of
the opinion that any restraint by agreement is improper.'
2
At this point, it should be noted that while Section 6 is commonly
referred to as a "venue" statute it is, in reality, more complex. It fixes
venue for federal courts, as a federal statute can properly do, at the same
time that it makes federal jurisdiction concurrent with that of equivalent
state courts. It does not purport to fix the venue of state tribunals for
that is a matter of state regulation. But it is unnecessary to go to Section
5 of the statute to determine which provisions of Section 6 may be the
subject of valid contract and which may not. It is elemental that while
jurisdiction cannot be conferred or waived by litigants, venue may be
a matter of personal choice unless otherwise specifically prohibited by
statute." Jurisdiction of state courts over proceedings under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act may not be contracted away, any more than
this is possible as to the federal courts. Venue provisions, however, whether
in relation to state or federal courts may be made the subject of valid
contract for there is no provision in the act to the contrary. Viewed in
this light, the holding in the Utah case is correct even if the reasoning
is unsound, but the same thing cannot be said of the other cases, including
the instant one. If Congress wants to say that the venue provisions of
Section 6 cannot be waived, it can do so. Until that time, courts should
not interfere with private arrangements which violate no express
legislative command nor undermine constitutional requirements.
Prior to the decision in Sherman v. Pere Marquette Railway
Company,1 4 courts were having little difficulty with the question. They
understood that the term "liability" as used in the Federal Employers'
11110 Utah 573, 175 P. (2d) 744 (1946). But see the concurring opinion of
Larson, Ch. J., and the dissenting opinion of Pratt, J., which appear to be much
better reasoned than the majority one.
12 Compare Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 8 F. R. D. 65 (1947), and Fleming
v. Husted, 68 F. Supp. 900 (1946).
13 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corporation, 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed.
167, 128 A. L. R. 1437 (1939).
14 62 F. Supp. 590 (1945).
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Liability Act meant one thing, while concepts such as "jurisdiction" and
"venue" meant something else. As early as 1936, for example, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Detwiler v. Lowden, 15 held valid an
agreement by an injured employee not to sue his employer except in the
state of the employee's residence or in the state where the injury was
inflicted. A federal district court sitting in the same state later came
to the same conclusion,'" as did another federal court in Missouri. 7 Even
more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that a different district court judge,
sitting in the same federal District Court in Illinois, after the decision
in the Pere Marquette case, held a similar contract to be valid1 8 despite
the influence of the earlier decision.
It is unfortunate, then, that the first and only higher federal court
holding on the subject has followed not only the weaker line of reasoning
with its predeliction for judicial legislation 9 but that it supports the
earthy and unprincipled result that plaintiffs, with the approval of the
judiciary, may now go "shopping for a judge or a jury believed to be
more favorable" 2 ° despite the terms of contracts freely made.
2
'
GRACE THOMAS STRIPLING
C ORPORATIONS--CoRPORATE EXISTENCE AND FRANCHISE-WHETHER
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION DESIGNED TO CANCEL
ACCRUED BUT UNDECLARED PREFERRED DIVIDENDS ON CUMULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK IS VOID AS TO OBJECTING STOCKHOLDERS--The transition
in economic levels from depression to war-born prosperity brought with
it a problem which was dealt with, for the first time in Illinois, in the
15 198 Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367, 107 A. L. R. 1054 (1936).
16 Detwiler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 15 F. Supp. 541 (1936). See also, from
the same court, the holding in Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (1942).
17 Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (1945).
18 Roland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 65 F. Supp. 630 (1946).
19 The recognized judicial function of interpreting ambiguous statutes is far re-
moved from writing laws to suit judicial beliefs: Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014 (1894).
20 Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 815 U. S. 698 at 706, 63 S. Ct. 827 at 831, 86 L.
Ed. 1129 at 1135, 146 A. L. R. 1104 at 1109 (1941).
21 Editorial Note: Since the foregoing material was written, the plaintiff's choice
of a forum has been lessened considerably by the adoption of Section 1404(a) of
the new Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. § 1404 (a). As to the application thereof to
suits arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act, see Ex parte Collett,
- U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 901 (1949). In the event Congress
should amend the Judicial Code in this respect, the foregoing material may possess
prime significance. See also, on the specific point concerned, the decision in
Kringer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F. (2d) 556 (1949), where the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Swan, C.J., dissenting, reached a similar result to that
attained in the instant case.
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recent case of The Western Foundry Company v. Wicker.1 The problem
grew out of the burden of accrued dividends which have accumulated on
the cumulative preferred stocks of many corporations, thereby preventing
the resumption of dividends on the common shares. In that case, the
defendant was a minority shareholder of both cumulative preferred and
common stock in the plaintiff corporation. Substantial accumulations had
accrued on the preferred stock when the plaintiff attempted to amend its
articles of incorporation, with the consent of two-thirds of the share-
holders of each class of shares, so as to cancel all right of the preferred
shareholders to the accrued but undeclared dividends by making changes
in the corporate capital structure. 2 Defendant neither attended the
stockholders' meeting called to vote on the amendment nor voted in favor
thereof, but frequently objected that the purported amendment was void.
Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to establish the validity of the
amendment, at which time the defendant counterclaimed for the payment
of all dividends accumulated on the preferred stock prior to the amend-
ment as well as for dividends declared subsequent thereto on both the
preferred and common shares. The trial court found in plaintiff's favor
but the judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First
District when it held the amendment to be void insofar as it sought to
cancel the accumulated unpaid preferred dividends. Leave to appeal
having been granted by the Illinois Supreme Court, that court reversed
the holding of the intermediate court and reinstated the decision of the
trial court to the extent that it held the amendment valid.
The fundamental question as to whether or not it is possible, by
forced amendment of the articles of incorporation, to cancel the right
to accrued cumulative dividends has never before been decided in Illinois,
either under the present Business Corporation Act or any prior statute.
For that matter, while many different phases of the problem have been
made the subject of extensive treatment in legal publications,- there are
1403 11. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), reversing 335 Ill. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d)
548 (1948).
2 The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate an operating deficit and to
permit the resumption of the payment of dividends. It was to be made pursuant
to authority allegedly contained in plaintiff's articles of incorporation to the effect
that "the corporation shall not, without the consent of the holders of at least two-
thirds (%) in amount of the preferred stock of the corporation at the time out-
standing ... alter or change the preferences hereby given to the preferred stock ...
[But] subject to the limitations hereinabove set forth, the authorized capital stock
of the corporation may be changed, the rights and preferences of the preferred
stock may be changed" etc. Although the corporation was organized under the
1919 Act, the holding in the instant case clearly reflects what the attitude of the
court would be to a problem arising under the present Business Corporation Act.
3Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1942).
See also discussions in 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 733; 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 104; 12 U. of
Cinn. L. Rev. 576; 40 Col. L. Rev. 633; 25 Corn. L. Q. 431; 9 Duke L. J. 76; 55
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relatively few cases in the country where the attempt has been made to
cancel such dividends outright,4 most of the cases involving voluntary
exchanges of stock with loss of accrued dividends occurring only as an
incident.5 Unlike its English counterpart, the Illinois corporation possesses
only those powers which are clearly conferred upon it by statute,' any
ambiguity being resolved against it,7 hence the answer to the problem
must be found, if at all, in statutory enactment 8 which would require
resolution of the subordinate problem as to whether any existing
statutory provision should be given retroactive or only prospective
operation.
While the provisions of Section 52 of the Business Corporation Act,'
dealing with amendment to the articles of incorporation, are generally
quite broad, only one sub-section thereof is in any way germane. It
permits the corporation, upon receiving sufficient approval from the
shareholders, to change the "preferences, qualifications, limitations,
restrictions, and the special or relative rights in respect of all or any
part" of its shares.'" Although the statute makes no specific reference
to dividends, the authority to change "preferences" among shares might
be considered adequate for this purpose since one common form of
preference between groups of shareholders is with respect to dividend
payments. But while the authority may be present to change preferential
Harv. L. Rev. 71; 54 Harv. L. Rev. 488; 33 Ill. L. Rev. 217; 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1201;
26 Minn. L. Rev. 387; 6 Ohio St. L. Rev. 313; 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 789; 7 U. of
Pitts. L. Rev. 326; 19 St. Johns L. Rev. 139; 29 Va. L. Rev. 1; and 46 Yale L. J.
1055. The author of a comment on the case of Consolidated Film Industries. Inc.
v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937), appearing in 16 CHICAGO-KENT
RFviEw 286, points out what the probable holding would be under the Illinois statute.
4 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936), involved an exchange
of stock and a cancellation of preferred dividends. Consolidated Film Industries,
Inc., v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937), dealt with a compulsory ex-
change of shares as well as a cancellation of accrued preferred dividends. See
also Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. E. (2d) 281
(1939) ; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906) ; Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923).
5 See, for example, Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Il1. 364, 29 N. E. (2d) 502
(1940), where the corporation amended its charter to provide for the issuance of
prior preferred stock with an option on the part of the existing preferred stock-
holders to exchange the preferred for the prior preferred. If exchange occurred,
the stockholder waived the right to accrued dividends but the exchange was not
compulsory and the shareholder who declined to exchange retained his right to
the old stock with its accumulated dividends. The court held no vested rights
were impaired, hence treated the amendment as being valid.
6 City of Marion, Ill. v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54 S. Ct. 421, 78 L. Ed. 787 (1934).
7 People ex rel. Lydston v. Hoyne, 182 Ill. App. 42 (1913).
8 Haberer v. Smerling, 225 I. App. 336 (1922).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.52.
10 Ibid., § 157.52(g).
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dividend features as to the future, that is far different from saying there
is authority to do so with respect to the past.
The Delaware Corporation Act, although not a verbal duplicate of
the Illinois statute, not only contains a substantially similar amendatory
provision but one which is likewise lacking in expression as to retroactive
operation." When passing upon the application of this statute to a
situation much like that found in the instant case, the Delaware Supreme
Court once said that it "authorizes nothing more than it purports to
authorize, the amendment of charters. The cancellation of cumulative
dividends already accrued through passage of time is not an amendment
of a charter. It is the destruction of a right in the nature of a debt, a
matter not within the purview of the section.' '12 The court, as a conse-
quence, held the statute to be without retroactive effect.
Much the same view was exhibited in the Ohio case of Harbine v.
Dayton Malleable Iron Company13 where the court, dealing with a statute
permitting changes in shares," also regarded as illegal an attempt to
cancel cumulative dividends. The Ohio legislature, however, realizing
the problem and the necessity for its solution, soon thereafter amended
the statute to add further authority to make changes in the corporate
structure to the point where the change might include the "discharge,
adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued undeclared cumulative
dividends" on any class of shares.' 5 Under a New Jersey statute, the
funding or satisfying of dividends in arrears may be accomplished by
the "issuance of stock therefor or otherwise." Statutes of this character
not only recognize the problem, which is more than can be said for the
one in Illinois, but they also prevent rise of the claim that the right to
dividends can be called a vested one, at least prior to declaration. As
these statutes become part of the contract between the shareholder and
11 Rev. Code Del. 1935, Ch. 65, § 26. The statute authorizes amendment, among
other things, by "increasing or decreasing its authorized capital stock or reclassify-
ing the same, by changing the number, par value, designations, preferences, or
relative, participating, optional, or other special rights of the shares, or the qualifi-
cations, limitations or restrictions of such rights, or by changing shares with par
value into shares without par value." See also Del. Corp. Law Anno., The Cor-
poration Trust Co., Chicago, 1947, p. 151.
12 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391 at &13, 190 A. 115 at 125 (1936).
13 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. E. (2d) 281 (1939).
14 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1938, § 8623-14, permits the corporation to amend
the charter so as to change "issued or unissued shares of any class whether with
or without par value into a different number of shares of the same class, or into
the same or a different number of shares of any other class or classes with or
without par value, theretofore or thereby created."
15 Ibid., § 8623-14(i), added by amendment in 1939, reads: "... which change, If
desired, may include the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued
undeclared cumulative dividends on any such class."
16N. J. Stat. Ann. 1939, § 14:11-1(n).
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the corporation, the former cannot claim that to be vested which he has
agreed shall be purely contingent.
Even if the Illinois act were broad enough to deal with the question,
there is nothing in its terms to indicate any purpose to make it retro-
spective in operation. On that score, the Illinois Supreme Court once
observed that no "rule of interpretation is better settled than that no
statute will be allowed a retrospective operation unless the will of the
General Assembly is declared in terms so plain and positive as to admit
of no doubt that such was the intention. Retrospective laws, although
they may be valid, are looked upon with disfavor, and an intention that
laws shall have such operation will not be supposed unless manifested
by the most clear and unequivocal expressions. '"7 Despite this, the same
court came to the conclusion in the instant case that what was essentially
a retroactive charter amendment should be sustained. To accomplish that
result, it had to reject the idea that shareholders' rights to accrued
dividends could be said to be "vested" and, instead, was forced to treat
the same as nothing more than a prospective "preference" subject to
cancellation in the manner agreed upon.
It is true that no dividend or dividend right can be called "vested"
prior to its declaration,18 but is it true, as the court said, that non-
declaration of cumulative preferred dividends merely enlarges the size
or quantity but does not change the character of the contractual right
of the shareholder? The average holder of cumulative preferred stock
would think otherwise, regarding the passed dividend as his due but
with its enjoyment temporarily postponed until more favorable times.
It is at this point, then, that a clear break occurs between the instant
case and other American holdings. One thing is certain, however, and
that is that the Illinois Supreme Court has shown the way by which it
will be possible to clear a backlog of arrearages on outstanding issues of
cumulative preferred stock.
G. W. HEDMAN
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-PAIIT1ES--WHETtHER CLASS SUIT MAY BE
MAINTAINED AGAINST ONE DEFENDANT AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR GROUP OF
NON-JOINED PARTIES DEFENDANT ON CLAIMS GROWING OUT OF LEGAL
DEMANDs-A provocative challenge concerning the extent to which a
fusion between law and equity has been produced by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure grew out of the recent case of Montgomery Ward &
17 People v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische, etc., Confession, 249 Ill. 132 at
137, 94 N. E. 162 at 165 (1911).
18 Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 (1875).
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Company, Inc. v. Langer.1  The plaintiff there sued Langer and some
seventy-one others in the United States District Court sitting in Missouri 2
to recover damages for an alleged libel. The individual defendants were
sued as individuals, as members of a national labor union and one of its
locals, and also as representatives of the entire membership of the un-
incorporated associations3 The union organizations, not being sui juris
in Missouri, were afterwards dropped as parties and the remaining
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the principal ground that
a complete diversity of citizenship did not exist. The District Court,
when considering the motion, passed over the stated ground, proceeded
to examine into the right of the plaintiff to bring a class suit, and
concluded that Rule 23(a) (1) of the Federal Rules was not applicable
to al action at law. When plaintiff chose not to amend the complaint
to divest the case of its representative character, the action was dismissed.
On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, that court, by a unanimous holding, reversed and remanded the
cause, treating the class action device as being applicable to the entire
field of civil litigation coming before the federal courts. It said, in part,
that if "courts will disregard the ancient and often arbitrary distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity and will permit the Rule to
operate in all cases to which it justly and soundly may be applied, it
will serve its intended purpose."'
Although the device of the class or representative suit was developed
by equity and was not, heretofore, available for use in law actions,5 no
serious issue can be taken with the interpretation given to Rule 23 by
the court from the technical standpoint, however novel its effect may be.
Not only did the enabling statute empower the United States Supreme
Court to prescribe rules for the district courts so as to secure one form
of action for law and equity,6 but the rules so adopted were expressly
declared to be applicable to all civil actions, with certain exceptions not
1168 F. (2d) 182 (1948). Johnsen, J., wrote a specially concurring opinion.
2 Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship.
3The basis for a class suit was said to be Rule 23(a) (1) of the Rules of Civ.
Pro. for U. S. District Courts, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, which provides: "If
persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the
adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (1) joint,
or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it."
4168 F. (2d) 182 at 187.
5 Markt & Co., Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 1021.
048 Stat. 1064; 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 723b and 723c.
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here involved.' The letter of transmittal accompanying the rules indicated
a deliberate purpose to provide but one form of action in the federal
courts for suits heretofore designated as being in law or equity.8 In
addition, the advisory committee, in a note to Rule 23(a), observed that
while the same was a substantial re-enactment of former Equity Rule 38,
which also dealt with representative suits, the revision was intended to
apply "to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal or equitable. "9
There is ample basis, therefore, at least on paper, for the instant holding.
But declaring that a class suit can be maintained in a law action is one
thing; making the principle work is another. The court has raised the
cover of a legal Pandora's box from under which the "misery and evils"
that confronted Epimethus will be deemed mere trifles compared to those
that can harry a legal scholar as he considers the effect of a judgment
in personam rendered as at law in a suit brought against a class of
defendants.
Once the question of whether a class suit will lie on legal demands
is answered affirmatively, the specially concurring opinion rendered by
Judge Johnsen in the instant case becomes of greater interest than the
main opinion, particularly because of his comments with respect to the
usefulness of any judgment which may be rendered therein. He first
notes that, as a matter of Missouri substantive law, members of non-profit
associations are not liable for the tortious acts of their officers or of other
members in the absence of proof of authorization, ratification, or
participation. Second, he states that pecuniary liability cannot attach,
as a result of the judgment, against those defendants not personally
before the court. But he indicates the judgment might be helpful, third,
in reaching the association's assets, and fourth, that it could probably
serve to foreclose all questions against the membership as a group,
leaving only the need to bring separate actions against the several
members of the class wherein the issue could be limited simply to the
question of their participation in, or authorization or ratification of, the
conduct held actionable.
A seemingly fundamental defect in the plaintiff's case ought to be
examined at the outset before considering the indicated consequences of
a judgment, if one were rendered against the defendants. The plaintiff
sued all of the members of the union as a class, presumably on the theory
7 The exceptions referred to in Rule 1, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, could not apply
to class actions.
8 See letter of the Chief Justice, U. S. Supreme Court, to the Attorney General
set forth in Manual of Federal Procedure (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1940), p. vii.
9 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, note to Rule 23.
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that the right sought to be enforced against the class was a joint one."°
Yet it does not appear that a truly joint right actually exists among
members of an association such as the one in the instant case. At most,
the defendants there were no more than alleged joint tort-feasors for
their association was not organized for profit and had no other legal
status. Being no more than joint tort-feasors, no jural relationship was
present among them which could be termed joint in the sense in which
that term has been applied as a prerequisite to the bringing of a class
suit. 1 Joint tort-feasors cannot be considered to be essential parties to
an action brought against any one of them for they are, usually, severally
liable and may not, in the absence of statute, get contribution from one
another. Unless the doctrine has now been developed that any group of
allegedly joint tort-feasors may be sued as a class, if sufficiently numerous
and joinder would be difficult, it is hard to believe that the defendants
in the instant case are members of a class as is contemplated by the rule
in question.
Supposing for the purpose that they are, consideration must then
be given to that which will follow in the wake of a judgment against
the class. What, first, of pecuniary liability? Judge Johnsen remarks
upon the fact that no jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against
the class defendants existed under former Equity Rule 38. If this be
true, and in view of the fact that the new rules were not designed to
"change previous jurisdictional concepts,'" the federal courts would
not now possess the necessary jurisdiction to pronounce a binding
judgment in personam against the represented defendants. There is a
complete absence of case law on this precise point, either in support of,
or in opposition to, the judge's contention. While some actions of legal
character involving the doctrine of virtual representation have been
maintained in code jurisdictions, not one of them was an action designed
to recover money damages against the class defendants. 13 In addition,
a reading of the textual authorities is no more profitable. At best, the
comments are inconclusive;14 at worst, the question is disregarded,'5
10 The principal opinion so regarded it: 168 F. (2d) 182 at 187.
11 It is here assumed that the reference in Rule 23(a) (1) to a "joint" right is
designed to follow the pattern established under former Equity Rule 38. There
the joint factor was determined from the presence of jural relations among the
members of the class: Moore, Federal Practice (Mathew Bender & Co., Inc., Albany,
N. Y., 1938), Vol. 2, p. 2235. That author rejects the need for a joint proprietary
interest or for the presence of a common fund, indicating rather that the true
class suit should be one wherein, but for the class action device, the "joinder of all
interested persons would be essential." Ibid., p. 2236.
12 See 28 U. S. C. A. § 723b.
13 The cases are collected in 39 Am. Jur., Parties, § 46, note 20.
14 See, for example, Moore, op. cit., p. 2283 et seq.
15 39 Am. Jur., Parties, §§ 44 and 52.
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probably because of a universally accepted attitude, prior to the codes,
that representative suits against class defendants were only to be brought
in equity concerning some res over which the court could extend its
power and to which it was obliged to confine the decree.
There being no precedent on, the particular question, it becomes
necessary to examine into the general nature of judgments in personam.
It is elementary, in fact it is a substantive right of every litigant, that
no tribunal shall have the power to make a binding adjudication as to
the rights in personam of the parties except where it has acquired
jurisdiction over them by due process of law.1" The due process required
when the proceeding is strictly one in personam, that is one brought to
determine personal rights and obligations, demands either valid personal
service or a voluntary appearance in the cause.' 7 Such being the case,
it can hardly be said that pecuniary damages can be assessed against the
class members in a representative suit, especially if they are present
in the litigation only by virtue of a rule of procedure not designed to
modify substantive rights. The class defendants in the instant case were
not personally served nor did they voluntarily appear. Therefore, if the
traditional elements of due process in personal actions are to remain
unaffected, it would appear that the same have not been satisfied in a
suit such as this one.
Professor Moore, working with the Advisory Committee who drafted
the rules in question, sought to obviate uncertainty as to the efficacy of
a judgment in. a suit brought within the framework of Rule 23 by
specifically declaring the several effects thereof. He proposed, under
Rule 23(a) (1), that the judgment should be conclusive against and
binding upon the entire class, but his proposal was rejected by the
committee as amounting to a substantive change in the law.'" The
decision to reject such proposal was sound in the light of the enabling
statute, but even if it had been the opposite way there would still be
occasion to question the worth of such a judgment. As one learned
authority has said, a judgment at law "disconnected from the right to
issue execution, would be so idle and worthless a record that we can
scarcely conceive that its creation would be encouraged, or its existence
tolerated. '19
If the judgment would not impose pecuniary liability on the members
16 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350, 60
S. Ct. 569, 84 L. Ed. 799 (1939).
17 McGehee, Due Process of Law under the Federal Constitution (Edw. Thomp-
son Co., New York, 1906), p. 89.
18 Moore, op. cit., p. 2283 et seq.
19 Freeman, Executions, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 30, § 10.
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of the class, can it then truly be the "helpful step" which the specially
concurring opinion suggests it would be to reach the association's assets?
The judgment being a nullity as to the personal estates of those before
the court merely as a class, it would seem to be a non sequitur to say
that the assets of the association would be subject to execution on such
a judgment, particularly where the association is not suable as an entity.
At most, only so much of the assets as represents the interests of those
personally before the court might be levied upon, and even this is doubtful.
The interests of individuals who compose an unincorporated nonprofit
association are peculiar in the law. It has been said that by becoming a
member a person "ordinarily acquires, not a severable right to any of
its property or funds, but merely a right to the joint use and enjoyment
thereof so long as he continues to be a member." '2 0 Since the right of
any individual is not severable, it is probably immune from execution
although, comparable to the share of a partner, it might be subjected
to equitable processes.21
Difficulties would likewise arise if the judgment were to be employed
as the basis of a suit in attachment to reach funds in the hands of the
association. 22 The tort claim has been reduced to a liquidated obligation
only as to those members of the class personally under the court's
jurisdiction. So far as the rest of the membership is concerned, the
plaintiff has only a professed right to sue them in- tort, a claim which
would hardly support an attachment against their interests. The class
judgment, then, would settle few problems as to pecuniary liability:
Would such a judgment serve to minimize future proof by fore-
closing all questions except those relating to participation, authorization,
or ratification by other members of the class when the latter are sued
in separate actions? Here again-, there is uncertainty of success. The
orthodox view has been that a judgment in a law action is res judicata
only as to the immediate parties and their privies. 23 The judgment being
inadequate to impose pecuniary liability, it is difficult to see how other
members, subsequently sued, would be estopped to deny .facts established
in the representative suit on any accepted theory of privity.24 The almost
inescapable conclusion, then, is that any judgment which might be
20 7 C. J. S., Associations, § 27.
21 See Sec. 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act; 7 Unif. Laws Anno. 162.
22 4 Am. Jur., Attachment and Garnishment, § 374; Waples, A Treatise on Attach-
ment and Garnishment (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1895), § 250; Wade, A Treatise
on Attachment and Garnishment (Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, 1887), § 36,
note 6.
23 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 178.
24 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 959, § 438.
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rendered in favor of the plaintiff would be worthless for all practical
purposes, except as it might be used against those defendants over whom
jurisdiction was established without the aid of the class suit device.
It must, in candor, be admitted that none of the questions posed
by the instant case is amenable to a conclusive answer at this stage of
the development of the rule. The very novelty thereof causes any proffered
solution to be no more than speculation. But it is doubtful if the matter
should be left to be worked out, as was suggested by the court, through
a "case by case demonstration of what [it] is possible for the rule to
do in actual practice. 25 So many fundamentals of substantive principle
are involved that nothing short of congressional action will serve. One
commentator has suggested a revision which would make notice to all
the members of the class a condition precedent to a class action, leaving
the mechanics of the notice to be left to the discretion of the court
concerned.26 Such a revision, if authorized by statute, would amount
to a declaration of what should be deemed due process in class actions
in personam and might serve to bind all members of the case whether
they elected to file an appearance or not. If the judgment then pronounced
were also declared to be conclusive only as to facts actually litigated
and established, the possibility of individual injustice, as where there
was a failure by those representing the class to raise a meritorious
personal defence, would be prevented. Without implementation by such
a revision, the present rule might as well be. returned to its original
service in connection, with truly equitable matters for it is not yet a
mechanism fully adapted for use with all civil actions.
D. C. AHERN
TORS--INVASION OF PERSONAL SAFETY, COMFORT OR PRIVACY-
WHETHER PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPH WITHOUT PERMISSION CONSTITUTES
VIOLATION OP RIGHT OF PRIVACY-TwO recent federal cases, one arising
in the District of Columbia and the other in Minnesota, renew interest
in the question of the existence of a right of privacy. In the first of
them, that of Peavy v. Curtis Publishing Company,' the District Court
for the District of Columbia had to rule on a case involving the un-
authorized publication of plaintiff's photograph in conjunction with a
satirical article appearing in a national magazine concerning taxicab
drivers in the nation's capital where plaintiff was a woman taxicab driver.
25 168 F. (2d) 182 at 189.
26 See an unsigned note entitled "Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Reform of
Rule 23," in 46 Col. L. Rev. 818 (1946), particularly pp. 834-5.
178 F. Supp. 305 (1948).
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The complaint contained two counts, one for libel and the other for
damages flowing from the invasion of a claimed right of privacy.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency was readily
overruled as to the libel count but, because the question of the existence
of a right of privacy was an open one in the District,2 the court went
to some length to establish that such a right did exist. In reaching that
decision, the court, at least by implication, joined the bolder or, as
described by some, the more enlightened courts3 which recognize a legal
right of privacy independent of some property right, or implied contract,
or breach of trust, a right which has been roughly described as the right
to be let alone. The court stated that it is "time that fictions be abandoned
and the real character of the injury be frankly avowed. "4 The second
case, that of Berg v. The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company,5 was
brought for an alleged wrongful publication of a news photograph taken
of plaintiff during a recess in a court hearing between plaintiff and his
wife over the custody of their children. It was alleged that plaintiff's
right of privacy had been invaded to his humiliation and distress. The
court there, however, denied recovery, quoting from the celebrated article
on the subject by Warren and Brandeis to the effect that the "right of
privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public
interest."6 Although recovery was denied, it is of interest to note that
the court did not discuss the necessity of finding one of the usual bases
for the right of privacy but seemed to assume its independent existence.
A reading of the decisions dealing with the subject leaves an im-
pression of substantial lack of uniformity in the reasoning employed to
2 But see Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927), decided by
the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, wherein the defendant newspaper
published a picture that had been stolen from plaintiff. A demurrer to a complaint
predicated on an invasion of the right of privacy was overruled.
3 Feinberg, "Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy," 48 Col. L. Rev. 713
(1948), discusses the growth of the law of privacy and notes a trend to recognize
the existence of a right of privacy independent of either a property right, a
contractual or a confidential relationship. See also Restatement, Torts, Vol. 4,
§ 867 and annotation in 138 A. L. R. 22.
4 78 F. Supp. 305 at 308.
5 79 F. Supp. 957 (1948).
6 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at 214
(1890). It was not until the publication of this article that the right of privacy
was introduced and defined as an independent right and the distinctive principles
upon which it was based were formulated. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in
Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 at 193, 50 S. E. 68 at
69 (1905), noted that, prior to 1890, "every case in this country and in England
which might be said to have involved a right of privacy was not based upon the
existence of such right, but was founded upon a supposed right of property, or
breach of trust, or confidence, or the like, and that therefore a claim independent
of a property or contractual right or some right of a similar nature had, up to
that time, never been recognized in terms of any decision."
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support the right of privacy. Some recognize its existence only when
property is involved, a contractual relationship can be implied, or when
a relationship of trust can be established. A second group place recog-
nition on a constitutional basis. Others say an independent legal right
of privacy exists and seek no further for its support.
Indicative of the first view are decisions from England where the
courts have long been hampered by the unfortunate dictum, pronounced
by Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard7 to the effect that equity acts to
protect only property rights. In Prince Albert v. Strange,8 for example,
it was declared that the defendant could not be restrained from perform-
ing the acts he was doing simply on the ground that plaintiff's feelings
would be injured thereby so long as no property right was being invaded.
Still later, in Pollard v. Photographic Company,9 the court had to search
for an implied contract before it could say that defendant's conduct
amounted to an actionable breach. Much the same sort of reasoning was
relied upon in the early New York case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Company.10 There the court adverted to the fact that the law is
not designed to remedy all evils so that if a right of privacy was to exist
it would be a legislative function to create one.1 But such uncritical
reliance on dictum has been condemned both by writers 2 and courts"
7 2 Swanst. 402 at 413, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 at 674 (1818).
8 2 DeG. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1848).
9 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
10 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 59 L. R. A. 478 (1902).
11 The New York legislature was not slow to follow the hint. The present statute
may be found in Cahill, Cons. Laws New York 1930, Civil Rights Law, Art 5, § 51.
12 Pound, "Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,"
29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916); Chafee, "The Progress of the Law-1919-1920,"
34 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1921); Long, "Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
Rights," 33 Yale L. J. 115 (1923) ; W. B. G., "A Re-interpretation of Gee v.
Pritchard," 25 Mich. L. Rev. 889 (1927); Walsh, "Equitable Protection of Personal
Rights," 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. 878 (1930); Leflar, "Equitable Prevention of Public
Wrongs," 14 Tex. L. Rev. 427 (1936) ; Bennett, "Injunctive Protection of Personal
Interests-A Factual Approach," 1 La. L. Rev. 665 (1939) ; Oberfell, "Jurisdiction
of Equity to Protect Personal Rights," 20 Notre Dame Law. 56 (1944). Case com-
ments on the decision in Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S. W. (2d) 663 (1937), to
be found in 51 Harv. L. Rev. 166 and 13 Ind. L. J. 416, are to the same effect, the
latter one referring to the adherence to the dicta of Lord Eldon as "unintelligent."
But see Simpson, "Fifty Years of American Equity," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171 at 222
(1936), who states: "May not the repeated judicial statements that equity protects
only rights of property involve something more than the uncritical acceptance of
an old dictum of Lord Eldon? May not these statements be predicated on a deeper
wisdom in the actual administration of justice through fallible human instruments
than are the logically sound and humanly appealing arguments of modern legal
scholarship?"
13 See, for example, Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. (2d) 852 (1942)
Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 So. 861, 5 A. L. R. 1041 (1919) ; Foley v. Ham,
102 Kan. 66, 169 P. 183, L. R. A. 1918C 204 (1917) ; Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103
S. W. (2d) 663 (1937) ; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228, 116 Am.
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who have attacked the fundamental premise, still followed by some
tribunals, 14 that preventative relief is not available to secure interests
in personality where no property right is concerned."
Only two states have turned to constitutional provisions to find
support for the right of privacy. The Missouri case of Barber v. Time,
Incorporated6 rests squarely on a provision in the bill of rights to the
state constitution to the effect that all men have inalienable rights to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness ;17 thereby obviating an earlier case
which had striven to find a property right in a picture as justification
for recovery. 1 8 The California case of Melvin v. Reed,"9 on the other
hand, used two premises to support recovery, one founded on a similar
constitutional guarantee, 2 the other treating the right as an incident to
personality rather than arising from property. The infrequent reference
in the cases to the constitutional right to pursue happiness is the more
noteworthy as it has been passed over in all of the more recent decisions
although the constitutional guarantee has been universally accepted in
this country.
The third and more liberal attitude, recognizing an independent
legal right attaching to every human being, whether property owner or
not, is displayed in the decisions from the highest courts of eleven
American jurisdictions2 1 as well as in nisi prius decisions to be found
St. Rep. 215 (1906) ; Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936, 14 A. L. R. 286
(1920) ; Hawkes v. Yancey, 265 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924). Not all of these
cases are "privacy" cases but all are critical of the so-called "property" concept
of equity jurisdiction.
14 The insistence on "property" right is evident in the following cases: In re
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888) ; Smith v. Ham, 207 Ark.
507, 181 S. W. (2d) 475 (1944); Blanton v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 So. 14-1
(1926) ; People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N. E. 387, Ann. Cas. 1915B 155 (1914) ;
White v. Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (1918) ; Chappell v. Stewart, 83 Md. 323, 33 A.
542, 37 L. R. A. 783, 51 Am. St. Rep. 476 (1896).
15 In Kenyon v. City of Chicoppee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N. E. (2d) 241 (1946), the
court pronounced Lord Eldon's dictum to be a "sweeping generalization" unsup-
ported by any convincing reasons.
16 34g Mo. 1191, 159 S. W. (2d) 291 (1942).
17 Mo. Const. 1875, Art. II, § 4.
18 In Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911), the defendant
had demurred on the ground that the invasion of the right of privacy was not
actionable unless accompanied by some injury to property or interference therewith.
The court observed that plaintiff had an exclusive right to his picture on the score
of it being a property right of "material profit."
19 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
20 Cal. Const. 1879, Art. I, § 1.
21 Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133 (1945) ; Cason
v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 (2d) 635 (194,7), and the companion case of Cason v.
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in Ohio 22 and Pennsylvania. 23 In each instance, fictional bases for recovery
have been repudiated and no reference has been made to any constitutional
guarantee. An actionable invasion has been said to occur in those states
whenever there has been an "unwarranted appropriation or exploitation
of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which
the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities, in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffer-
ing, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. "24 The
weight of authority, to say the least, is favorable to that view.
Whether courts of appellate rank in Illinois would recognize a right
of privacy remains to be seen. Should they desire to do so, they now have
the advantage of a substantial body of precedent on which to rely. They
could summon to their aid the same type of constitutional provision
utilized in other states.25 They could conjure up property rights where
none in fact exist. They might imply contracts in areas where the law
of quasi-contracts would fear to trespass. They could, if they feared
historical prejudices limiting common law writs, find a relationship of
trust without a corpus, to meet the doctrine that equity acts only to
protect property rights. They might insist that the problem is one for
legislative cognizance only. But if they would stand with the growing
majority, they would fearlessly proclaim that privacy is as natural a
human right as is that of bodily security.
W. H. BREWSTEM
Baskin, 155 Fla. 307, 20 So. (2d) 243 (1944); Pavesich v. New England Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. I. A. 101 (1905) ; Patton v. Jacobs,
- Ind. -, 78 N. E. (2d) 789 (1948) ; State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364,
66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 166; Kunz v.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532, L. R. A. 1918D 1151 (1918) ; Maysville Transit Co.
v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S. W. (2d) 369 (1944) ; Dean v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La.
671, 111 So. 55, 52 A. L. R. 1023 (1927) ; Frey v. Dixon, 141 N. J. Eq. 481, 58 A. (2d)
86 (1948); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N. J. Eq. 341, 54 A. (2d) 469 (1946);
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938) ; Hinish v. Meyer
& Frank Co., Inc., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. (2d) 438, 138 A. L. R. 1 (1941) ; Holloman
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. (2d) 169, 127 A. L. R. 110 (1940).
22 Freedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Ex. Board, 20 Ohio Op. 473 (1941). There
is dictum to the same effect in Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938).
23 Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940) ; Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa.
D. & C. 101 (1939). But see the earlier case of Owen v. Hinman, 1 Watts & S.
548 (Pa., 1841), wherein the court denied recovery because the plaintiff had no
property that was being injured. The concurring opinion of Justice Maxey, In
Waring v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), Is
often cited as recognizing an independent right of privacy.
24 41 Am. Jur., Privacy, § 2.
25 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
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WILLS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT CANCELLATION
OF ONE OF Two DUPLICATE ORIGINAL WILLS OPERATES TO REVOKE OTHER
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL LEFT IN CUSTODY OF ANOTHER PERSON-The Illinois
Supreme Court recently had occasion to determine a novel question in the
law of wills when it reviewed the lower court holding in the case of
In re Holmberg's Estate.1  The decedent there concerned had executed
a typewritten original of her will as well as a copy, the copy being a
carbon impression of the original instrument. Both were executed in
conformity with statutory requirements. 2 The decedent delivered the
original to a friend for safekeeping but retained the executed carbon
copy. Upon decedent's death, the friend filed the original instrument
in the probate court and the person named to act as executrix filed a
petition for probate. A few days later, the carbon copy was found in
decedent's home and it, too, was filed. The carbon copy, however, had
the word "void" written diagonally down the length of the first page
so as to extend across each paragraph appearing thereon. The word
"void," with the decedent's signature above and below it, was also
written in large letters on the second page above the original attesting
signatures. It was conceded that the superimposed writings were in the
handwriting of the testatrix, and that the carbon impression also bore
the legend "Copy." The Probate and Circuit Court, upon finding that
both the original and the duplicate copy of the will and the inscriptions
written thereon were executed by the decedent, declared the words so
written on the carbon copy were effective to revoke the original instru-
ment and therefore denied probate of the purported will. The proponents
appealed from this order, thereby projecting the question as to whether
an otherwise effective revocation of a will3 is to be deemed nullified by
the continued existence, in the possession of another, of a duplicate
original bearing no mark or evidence of revocation. That question was
answered, for the first time in this state, when the Supreme Court,
affirming the decision below, held that the cancellation of one of two
duplicate originals operated to revoke the other will also.
Because of the novelty of the issue in Illinois,4 the court turned for
1400 Ill. 366, 81 N. E. (2d) 188 (1948).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 194.
3 The court decided that the defacement appearing on the duplicate copy would
have been sufficient to cause a revocation if it had been placed on a single instru-
ment executed by the testator.
4 A more complete discussion of other aspects concerning revocation and revival
of wills, but exclusive of the question involved herein, may be found in Zacharias
and Maschinot, "Revocation and Revival of Wills," 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw
at pp. 185-215, 271-323, and in Vol. 26, pp. 107-55.
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support to those states that had previously had occasion to decide the
question and had reached the conclusion that the revocation of a duplicate
executed copy of a will might serve to revoke the original5 but that
the destruction 6 or loss 7 of the duplicate original merely raises a pre.
sumption of revocation which is rebuttable and, therefore, becomes
a fact issue.8 In the case of In re Martin's Wil,9 for example, the
testator executed duplicate copies of his will but destroyed the original
which had been retained in his possession. Evidence introduced in the
proceeding to probate the duplicate copy tended to show that the testator
had destroyed the instrument in his possession because it was marred
by ink spots. The court, admitting the copy to probate, said that the
mere failure to produce the original of the testator's will did not serve
to bar admission to probate of the carbon copy.
But the rule remains that when the testator can be shown to have
had in his possession an executed copy of his will, and subsequently this
copy is either found destroyed or cancelled or cannot be found at all,
the presumption arises that the copy was destroyed animo revocandi.10
For this purpose, it makes little difference whether it is the original or
the duplicate impression that has become lost, destroyed or cancelled.
Thus, in the case of In re Wall's Will" the testator kept the carbon
5 In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70 (1917) ; Manangle v. Parker,
75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Lawrence's Will, 138 N. J. Eq. 134, 47 A.
(2d) 322 (1946) ; Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884) ; In re Wall's Will,
223 N. C. 591, 27 S. E. (2d) 728 (1943) ; In re Estate of Bates, 286 Pa. St. 58,3,
134 A. 513 (1926) ; Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939);
In re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
6 Manangle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Moore's Estate, 137
Misc. 522, 244 N. Y. S. 612 (1930).
7In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70 (1917) ; In re Breding's
Estate, 161 Misc. 322, 291 N. Y. S. 750 (1936) ; In re Andriola's Will, 160 Misc.
775, 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936).
8 Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939).
940 N. Y. S. (2d) 685 (1943).
10 Snider v. Burke, 84 Ala. 53, 4 So. 225 (1888) ; Stuart v. McWhorten, 238 Ky.
82, 36 S. W. (2d) 842 (1939) ; In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70
(1912) ; Manangle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Lawrence's
Will, 138 N. J. Eq. 134, 47 A. (2d) 322 (1946) ; In re Beaney's Estate, 62 N. Y. S.
(2d) 341 (1946) ; In re Flynn's Estate, 174 Misc. 565, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 571 (1940) ;
In re Robinson's Will, 168 Misc. 545, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (1938) ; In re Breding's
Estate, 161 Misc. 322, 291 N. Y. S. 750 (1936) ; In re Andriola's Will, 160 Misc.
775. 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936) ; In re Moore's Estate, 137 Misc. 522, 24'4 N. Y. S. 612
(1930) ; In re Vogelsang's Will, 133 Misc. 395 (1928) ; In re Field's Will, 109
Misc. 409, 178 N. Y. S. 778 (1919) ; In re Schofield's Will, 129 N. Y. S. 190 (1911) ;
Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884) ; In re Wall's Will, 223 N. C. 591, 27
S. E. (2d) 728 (1943) ; In re Dawson's Estate, 277 Pa. St. 168, 120 A. 828 (1923) ;
Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939) ; In re Wehr's Will,
247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
11223 N. C. 591, 27 S. E. (2d) 728 (1943). Accord: In re Robinson's Will, 257
App. Div. 405, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 324 (1939).
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copy and gave the original to the scrivener of the will. When the original
was filed for probate and it was found that the carbon copy was un-
accountably missing, the court held this was sufficient to raise the
presumption of revocation and, absent evidence to the contrary, the
instrument was revoked. Conversely, in the case of In re Field's Will,
1 2
the testator had kept possession of the original instrument and its un-
explained absence at death served to effect a revocation of the duplicate.
For that matter, the one-time existence of a number of executed
copies of the will has not served to* influence the court into modifying
this position. Thus, in the case of In re Moore's Estate,13 the unexplained
absence of the original copy of the testator's will, kept in his possession,
was deemed sufficient to nullify two other duplicate originals left in the
possession of others. The holding in In re Andriola's Wilt1 4 would like-
wise indicate that all copies of the will, whether in duplicate or multipli-
cate, are to be looked upon as collectively one will and, while only one
will is admitted to probate, all copies must be presented to the court
for the duplicate or multiplicate copy is the alter ego of the original.
The destruction or loss of a conformed copy of a will, on the other
hand, does not raise the presumption of revocation 5 any more than should
the destruction or loss of an unsigned copy.16
It has been said that the strength of the presumption that arises
when the testator is known to have destroyed one copy of a will which
has been executed in duplicate depends upon the fact situation. If he
destroyed the only copy in his possession, the presumption of an intent
to revoke would be strong. If he was possessed of both copies and
destroyed but one, it would be weaker. If he altered one and then
destroyed it, retaining the other entire, the presumption has been said
to still hold although even more faintly. 17  In Roberts v. Roberts, 8
however, the testator first altered and then destroyed one copy of his
will, both then being in his possession. The court held that, since the
testator had both copies in his possession and could have revoked or
12 109 Misc. 409, 178 N. Y. S. 778 (1919). Accord: In re Estate of Bates, 286 Pa.
St. 583, 134 A. 513 (1926).
13 137 Misc. 522, 244 N. Y. S. 612 (1930).
14 160 Misc. 775, 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936). See also In re Flynn's Estate, 174
Misc. 565, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 571 (1940).
15 In re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
16 Search reveals no case actually involving this point but that result would
seem to be dictated by principle. As the unsigned copy is not a "will" for lack of
execution, its destruction could hardly amount to a nullification of something it
does not purport to be.
17 Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 2, § 681.
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destroyed both, the fact that he allowed one to stand was evidence of
his intent to acknowledge the remaining copy as his will.
Upon precedent and principle, then, it appears that the instant case
has been correctly decided. It may, however, be pertinent to observe
that the questionable practice of executing duplicate wills might con-
ceivably lead to results quite unintended by the testator. The design
of such an individual is to achieve greater security thereby. In the event
one copy is lost, he has another with which to replace it. But a testator
who is ignorant of the legal effect to be given to the unexplained absence
of a duplicate executed will which has been kept in his possession achieves
not security but a result that may well be the opposite of his intended
testamentary disposition. These possible results are not beyond the realm
of probability; in fact, so possible do they become, that the careful
attorney would do well to advise his client of the pitfalls that exist in
executing duplicate wills. The suggestion is not made as a criticism of
the principle of law involved nor of the presumption based thereon, for
it is far more logical to presume that the testator intended to cause a
revocation of his will when he destroys the only copy in his possession,
or that he did destroy such copy with intent to revoke when its dis-
appearance is unexplained by any act or word of his, than to believe
the contrary. What is designed is a caution to the unwary testator
to have greater respect for an executed duplicate copy of his will.
H. SILVERSTEIN
